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Abstract—In the last few years, a countless number of permis-
sioned blockchain solutions have been proposed, with each one to
claim that it revolutionizes the way of the transaction processing
along with the security and privacy preserving mechanisms that
it provides. Hyperledger Fabric is one of the most popular
permissioned blockchain architectures that has made a significant
impact on the market. However, there are only few papers
of finding architectural risks regarding the security and the
privacy preserving mechanisms of Hyperledger Fabric. This
paper separates the attack surface of the blockchain platform
into four components, namely, consensus, chaincode, network
and privacy preserving mechanisms, in all of which an attacker
(from inside or outside the network) can exploit the platform’s
design and gain access to or misuse the network. In addition, we
highlight the appropriate counter-measures that can be taken in
each component to address the corresponding risks and provide
a significantly secure and enhanced privacy preserving Fabric
network. We hope that by bringing this paper into light, we
can aid developers to avoid security flaws and implementations
that can be exploited by attackers but also to motivate further
research to harden the platform’s security and the client’s
privacy.
Index Terms—Hyperledger Fabric, cyber-security, consensus
protocols, chaincode risks, network threats, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Hyperledger Fabric [1] (for simplicity Fabric), has recently
obtained massive popularity with hundreds of implementations
around the world, since it is quite scalable, lenient against
faults, and robust. For these reasons, among others, it can
satisfy more than enough and sufficiently better than any
other permissioned blockchain solution the purposes of an
enterprise-based environment. Only in the past year, it is con-
sidered as the most deployable distributed ledger, in various
areas of interest, such as the IoT ecosystem [2], the supply
chain finance [3], the medical data management [4] and more.
By its permissioned nature, Fabric is a closed system, in
which only the participants that have obtained the necessary
credentials are able to read or write to the ledger. These
participants are called peers and only a subset of them can
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approve transactions and in order to do so, they have to
mention their identity along with their signatures [5]. This
setting makes it easier for the peers to manage the transactions
on the ledger and it is typically the reason why Fabric is much
faster than the ongoing permissioned blockchains.
For the maintenance of the identities of all the participating
nodes (clients, ordering service nodes (OSNs) and peers)
responsible is the membership service provider, which is
one the most critical components of the platform, since it
manages any type of access by issuing credentials in a form
of cryptographic certificates that are used for authentication
and authorization.
The features of Fabric are not limited only to its design, the
support of pluggable consensus, which is another critical com-
ponent; provides an unprecedented level of extensibility and
specific the support of multiple ordering nodes that establish
consensus regarding the transactions’ total order. Moreover,
since version 1.0, Fabric’s ordering service comes without any
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocol that can
address possible malicious ordering nodes, implementing only
Crash-Fault-Tolerant (CFT) protocols based on Kafka and on
Raft.
Nearly almost all the permissioned blockchain solutions
can implement smart contracts, which are based on a pro-
grammable application logic that is being called each time
a transaction is being proposed. In Fabric’s case the smart
contracts are realized by means of an arbitrary program that
is authored in Go; the chaincode. The chaincode is executed by
a set of peers locally and before each transaction is appended
into the ledger, an output of the chaincode’s execution is taken
into account in order to decide whether a transactions is valid
or not and which data will be included to the ledger.
From the security perspective, we analyze Fabric into four
interconnected components, in which possible attacks and
leakage of private information can occur; namely: the con-
sensus, the chaincode, the network and its privacy preser-
vation mechanisms. As a result of our research, in each of
these components, we define the risks and we provide the
corresponding counter measures needed to be addressed and
enhance its security: a) The implemented consensus protocols
in Fabric can withstand only some of the ordering nodes to
crash but not to behave maliciously. b) The privacy protection
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2) Apache Kafka: Kafka [7] is a distributed pub-
lish/subscribe messaging pattern that is being used to transfer
large amount of log data with significantly low latency. Kafka’s
key components are the producers, the topics, the consumers
and the brokers. The recorded information is published from
the producers to a stream of messages called the “topic”,
which is a partition of segments of files. The messages are
stored from the brokers as the latest segment file and when
the producers publish messages to the partitioned logs, only
the subscribed consumers can consume these messages -
sequentially - by making requests to the brokers. Kafka’s fault
tolerance properties derive from the ZooKeeper [8] and they
can be achieved with the replication of the partitions between
the brokers. Since, Kafka follows the leader-follower design,
each partition has its own leader, whose actions are passively
replicated by its followers. Therefore, if the ongoing leader
crashes, a new election process begins with one of its followers
to take its place. Regarding its performance, Kafka showed
momentous results in [1] and brought significant enhance-
ments in the area of the business oriented and permissioned
blockchains. Thus, Kafka, surpassing Solo, is the suggested
protocol in version 1.0.
3) Raft: The Raft consensus protocol [9] is also based on
the “leader-election” model to establish consensus by electing
a leading node to acquire the incoming entries from the clients
and replicate them. To provide strong leader and coherency, the
protocol is separated into three phases, i.e. the leader election,
the log replication and the safety. The time in Raft proceeds
in arbitrary time periods, called “terms”, with each term to
be defined by an increasing number. The nodes in Raft are
hierarchically ranked in different states, with each node to be
either a leader, a follower or a candidate. The leader is the
principal entity of the protocol and it is elected per channel,
with the task to interact with the clients and then replicate its
entries to its synchronized followers. Therefore, in order to
achieve the best possible synchronization, it sends systematic
heartbeats to its followers and even if the network suspects
that the leader has crashed, at least one of its followers will
detect this divergence, cast a vote to the network and attempt
to take its place [10]. Some nodes might compete to win the
election by seeking votes from other nodes. Therefore, these
nodes are considered as “candidates”.
Raft ensures that exclusively a single node can become a
leader, even if some nodes miss a term or split ups occur. In the
first case the outdated node will revise the term’s number and
fall into the follower’s state; and in the latter, the current term
will be ended without any outcome of the election process.
Raft’s performance is not fully tested, but its adoption as
the recommended consensus protocol since the version 1.4.1,
showed that Raft can provide thousands of transactions in real
world scenarios [11] and twice the transaction’s throughput of
Kafka with even less latency [12].
4) BFT-SMaRt: BFT-SMaRt [13] is java-based consensus
protocol that can provide a secure ordering service for Fabric
[14]. In the ideal case where no adversarial validation repli-
cas (VRs) exist in the network, the BFT-SMaRt’s message
processing is identical to PBFT’s [15].
WHEAT is the component that BFT-SMaRt’s ordering
service [14] relies upon [16] to provide a powerful vote
assignment scheme, low latency and fast replication among the
VRs, without imperiling the network’s security. The ordering
service consists of the cluster nodes and the frontends. By
adopting BFT-SMaRt as the consensus protocol, the trans-
action flow is almost the same to [1]. Upon the collections
of the endorsements from the peers, a client generates a
signed envelope that contains the channel’s identity and the
peer’s endorsements accompanied by their signatures [1]. This
envelope is disseminated to the frontends and finally sent to the
OSNs for ordering. When the OSNs collect a predetermined
number of envelops from some trusted frontends or when a
predetermined time has elapsed, a new block is created that
contains only the valid transactions. Therefore, the transac-
tions’ validation differs from [1] and it occurs prior to the
creation of the block’s signature. Finally, all the same, the
block is transferred to the frontends and then to the peers that
manage the ledger. BFT-SMaRt’s performance is measured in
[14] and showed that it can achieved throughput more than 10
thousand TPS and the block confirmation time to be less than
1sec.
B. Comparison
The adoption of Solo creates a SPoF, since it is not lenient
against malicious failures and crashes and for this reason, it
should not be deployed in real world environments. Both Raft
and Kafka benefit from the “leader-follower” model to address
crashes, but despite Kafka’s popularity, various intricate com-
ponents have to be handled for its implementation. In Raft’s
case, these components are enclosed to the ordering service
[11], meaning that there are less components that might crash.
Kafka is designed to be deployed in an environment with a
small number of OSNs and the cluster to be managed by a
single entity. This concept does not contribute much to escalate
the system’s decentralization, forcing all the OSNs to be
ulcerated by a single entity. In contrast to Kafka, a Raft-based
ordering service is more decentralized, more scalable and it
can achieve a greater throughput [12]. For reasons as such,
the Kafka and the Solo consensus protocols are deprecated
in Fabric’s version 2.0. Despite Kafka’s deprecation though,
a reconstruction of the Fabric’s transaction flow managed to
increase Kafka’s throughput from 3.5 to 20 thousand TPS [17].
On the other hand, BFT-SMaRt can not only achieve a
remarkable transaction performance of 10 thousand TPS but it
also can withstand tolerance against possible malicious behav-
ior by the OSNs. In BFT-SMaRt, the invalid transactions are
not included in the blocks, since the transactions’ validation
occurs prior to the block’s creation and dissemination to the
peers. Although BFT-SMaRt seems to outperform Raft, both in
terms of security and performance; it is a Java-based library
that it does not provide a very stable ordering service and
therefore it is not being currently adopted by the Hyperledgr
Project. BFT-SMaRt’s drawback though is that it necessitates
two processes to operate; the first built in Java and the second
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from GO, using a network socket bound among them, which
can act as bottleneck in the system’s operation.
C. Consensus’ challenges and open issues
The consensus protocol is the most critical component of a
distributed ledger. CFT protocols are consider to be contradict-
ing to the platform’s security, since any malicious action can
affect the network’s security. The BFT protocols are adopted
to permissioned blockchain solutions for targeted use cases,
in which the requirements to provide a secure implementation
is more evident. The fact that each peer in a permissioned
network is accountable for its behavior, provides an incentive
to the nodes to adhere to the protocol. In spite of the tolerance
that the consensus protocol provides (i.e. CFT or BFT), Fabric
can mitigate the most familiar and sophisticated consensus-
oriented attacks, such as the double spending, by its design.
Therefore, the consolidation of Fabric and a CFT consensus
protocol can be considered as an ideal implementation in a
confidential network, such as an enterprise environment.
III. SMART CONTRACTS’ SECURITY
The execution of the smart contracts defines operations that
have been acknowledged by all the participating entities; with
each one to execute the contract locally, propose the result to
the network and then collaborate with it to select which result
is going to be inserted into the ledger. The development of
smart contracts can incorporate several programming errors
that can ultimately lead to exploitable bugs and malicious
behavior. Consequently, the smart contracts are prone to code
errors and inconspicuous vulnerabilities, while their accuracy
and security can be violated by malicious programmers by
means of exploits.
A. Chaincode’ vulnerabilities and Fabric’s specification
The programs’ defects, such as coding flaws and designing
errors, are the main reasons that cause the smart contracts’
vulnerabilities. In [18], a large variety of Ethereum smart
contracts vulnerabilities have been identified and showed that
programming flaws lead to faulty behavior, a series of attacks
and possible exploits. As we are focused on Hyperledger
Fabric and particularly to the Fabric’s chaincode, our following
discussion is focused on risks that might ascend from the
programming languages, the Fabric’s features and the mis-
understanding of the common practices.
Fabric’s smart contracts were not built with the vision of
being strained to a domain-specific programming language
(DSL), such as the Ethereum’s Solidity, but rather to be
authored in high-level languages (such as Go, Java and
Node.js) to reduce the developers’ learning cost. Formally,
the smart contracts that have been authored in DSLs are
ruled by particular features and restrains for blockchains.
Since this is not the case of Fabric, the known risks and
vulnerabilities might differ with the risks associated with
general-purpose programming languages. Therefore, based on
[19], [20], [21] and [22], we outline in the following table the
most prominent security vulnerabilities in Fabric’s chaincode.
The programming language Go is the most widely used during
the chaincode’s development and thus, most of these security
vulnerabilities derive from its non-deterministic behavior. Nev-
ertheless, Fabric has no native cryptocurrency built in and thus,
it is not easy to define how severe each vulnerability is and
how easy or difficult it is for an attacker to exploit possible
bugs and execute double spending attacks.
In the execution phase, the peers do not execute the
chaincode at the same time andin the same environment. If
a transaction is valid and the results that derive from the
chaincode’s execution are not deterministic, in the validation
phase these results might be rejected or allow double spent
transactions to be included to the ledger. The risks that
derive from the Go language, from the platform’s features or
from mis-understanding of the common practices can lead to
inconsistencies to the peers’ ledger:
1) Random key generation: Since, the simulation of the
chaincode occurs in each endorsing peer, the random seed for
the keys is different. In Go, the random seed is set as 1 and
therefore can be easily predicted by a client.
2) Object reification: The value of the variables are handled
through a pointer, which is an address of memory. Therefore,
using reified object addresses might cause non-determinism.
3) System Timestamp: It is difficult to ensure that the
timestamps are run concurrently in each peer.
4) The global state variables: Global state variables that
are not stored to the ledger, might change innately and cause
inconsistencies to the endorsing results.
5) Concurrency: If multiple transactions are executed con-
currently and under high load, a possible change at the keys’
versions might lead to key collisions and double spending. For
example, if a transaction has passed from the endorsing phase
and its version key has changed before it reaches the validation
phase not only a program error will occur but this action might
also allow another (possible double spent) transaction to be
included to the ledger.
6) The non-determinism that ascends from peripheral re-
sources: Some accessing resources, such as web services, ex-
ternal libraries, external files and system command executions;
can corrupt the code and return different endorsing results
among the endorsing peers.
7) Range query risks: Queries methods to access the Fab-
ric’s state databases and obtain private data, (e.g. the history
or the state of a key); are not executed again in the validation
phase and can lead to phantom reads, in which the dirty data
cannot be detected.
8) Chaincode sandboxing: Although, Fabric’s chaincode is
executed in an isolated docker container and provides sufficient
privileges, it can be exploited in a malicious way, such as to
execute port scanning, identify and exploit vulnerable peers,
install malicious software and execute attacks.
9) Log injection: Any corruption of the log messages can
possible avert them from being executed automatically and
allow the attacker to view the processed logs.
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10) Map structure iteration: Due to the hidden implemen-
tation details of the Go programming language, when an
iteration with map structure is used, non-determinism may
arise and the order of key values might be different.
B. Chaincode’s challenges and open issues
A docker container, by its design, is significantly secure,
particularly when the processes are executed with no privi-
leged users in the container. Albeit, developers should be fa-
miliar with the dockers’ security issues to fully take advantage
of the security and the efficiency that the dockers provide.
Thus, in this section we discuss the proactive measures that
can be reserved to increase the smart contracts’ security:
• Timeline limitations of the chaincode’s execution can be
employed;
• The chaincode’s execution can be performed with privi-
leges other than root;
• GO’s crypto/rand package can be used to produce a
crytographically secure random seed for the keys and
minimize the risk of double spending;
• Any changes at the keys’ versions can increase the pos-
sibility of double spending and thus, should be avoided;
• Only trusted services peripheral of the platform should
be accessed;
• Chaincode’s input arguments should be checked for es-
cape characters;
The aforementioned counter-measures can be easily taken
into account during the chaincode’s implementation. Nonethe-
less, a number of other techniques [20] are relied upon formal
verification approaches to mitigate risks in smart contracts:
1) Theorem proving: One of the most ordinary methods
to formalize smart contracts. Symbolic logic (with axioms or
premises) is used in theorem proving to prove the necessary
security properties that enhance the contracts’ accuracy.
2) Symbolic execution tools: This technique uses testing
tools, such as the Chaincode Scanner, to perform static anal-
ysis and find bugs, vulnerabilities and bad practices in the
chaincode, as well as, to provide a detailed description of a
possible problem.
3) Formal modeling: This method formalizes the smart
contracts’ risks, by using precise statements that define the
relationship between the smart contracts’ components re-
sulting in a) unambiguous communication, and b) replica-
ble/reproducible results. These risks are classified into seven
categories [23], that analyze the platform’s properties; specif-
ically: “privacy, security, bug bounty, trustworthiness of data,
scalability and correctness of the consensus protocol.
Although, these techniques are not the most common for
verification of the smart contracts (according to [23]), they
seems to be a quite promising field of research, especially in
the Fabric’s case [24].
IV. NETWORK’S SECURITY
With the increase of interest in permissioned blockchains;
networks that possess the qualifications to handle adminis-
trative permissions, the possibility of an anonymous attacker
feigning to behave correctly is almost minimized. Attacks
and strategies such as the 51%, the Sybil attack, the block
withholding and the selfish strategy are lesser risks to the
network’s security [25], [26], due to the trust and the restricted
permissions to those given access to the network.
A. Network’s threats and Fabric’s specification
The rise of Fabric, on the other hand, comes with new secu-
rity risks and concerns that can harm the network’s operation
and performance [27]. Therefore, in this section, we present
the most prominent attacks that derive from the network’s
level, if some participating entities are compromised; along
with feasible countermeasures to enhance its security.
1) Compromised membership service provider (MSP): The
most revolutionary aspect of blockchains lies in the decentral-
ized nature of a trustless network and Fabric seems to violate
just that. The centralized aspect of Fabric lies on the MSP
and the following Certificate Authority (CA). The MSP is
a critical component of the platform, since it manages the
registration, the identities and the type of access of all the
nodes in the network; comprising the clients, the peers and the
OSNs. Therefore, if the MSP is compromised, administrative
controls such as adding and removing identities to and from
the network, as well ass, the type and the amount of the given
access to the existing nodes are all managed entirely by the
attacker. With a malicious MSP, the unauthorized access that
is given to the attacker can cause serious damage and possible
lead to further attacks such as: invalid identification attack,
double-spending, attacks on the CA, etc. [27].
2) Identified endorsers: In Fabric’s execution phase, a
transaction needs to be approved by a set of endorsers.
In return, the endorsers, approve the transaction mentioning
their identity along with their signatures so that they can be
verified in the forthcoming phases. However, Fabric has some
drawbacks when the peers are identified [28], [29], namely:
• Creation of conflicts: For some transaction, the endorsing
peers may have different opinion about their validity. By
revealing their identities, possible conflicts can be created
within the consortium [29].
• Majority’s decision: The endorsement policy not only
does not allow the endorsers to approve the transaction
in secret, but also takes into consideration the majority’s
decision.
• DoS attacks: An opening for DoS attacks on selective
endorsers might be created, either to halt specific trans-
actions from being included to the ledger or to degrade
the network’s performance [28].
• Wormhole attacks: An opening for wormhole attacks
might be created, if a peer behaves maliciously and
colludes with an adversary exterior to the channel. This
attack can lead to leakage of private information of all the
peers of a specific channel. This problem is concluded
by defining the fact that the Fabric’s access control
mechanism is depended on trusting each peer inside a
channel [30], [31].
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B. Network’s challenges and open issues
The aforementioned analysis for the MSP and the endorsers
indicates that the appropriate safeguards are not in place to
mitigate network’s risks in the context of Fabric. Although the
platform offers strong accountability in the network to meet
the necessary flavors of security, the research in this field is
still ongoing. Thus, some other possible approaches that could
be appropriately adopted in the (near) future are:
1) Securing the MSP: The possible threats that can derive
from a compromised MSP are tackled in a recent study [32]
with the adoption of Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX).
The SGX remote attestation techniques and the contained
execution features that this method provides, can register each
entity of the system as a trusted node. The capabilities that the
SGX provides can secure the MSP in all the phases that it is
invoked; including each node’s registration, the transaction’s
signature and its verification. An SGX enabled MSP can
also mitigate various privacy risks in Fabric and enhance
the network’s defense against possible attacks. Therefore, the
attack surface of the membership service is required to be
analyzed completely and rigorous proofs should to be created
to formally quantify all the risks that are aligned with it.
2) Pseudonymizing the endorsers: Motivated by the afore-
mentioned risks regarding the endorsers identification, the
authors in [29], created a ring signature scheme, named
Fabric’s Constant-Sized Linkable Ring Signature (FCsLRS) to
pseudoanonymize the endorsers’ identities. They implemented
this signature scheme in GO and provided experimental anal-
ysis about its security and performance by shifting the Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) modulus size. In the anonymized
endorsement system that they have implemented, a threshold
endorsement policy needs a set of endorsers to approve a
transaction without revealing their identity and only by count-
ing and checking individual valid ring signatures. A similar
work of [28], evaluated the outcome of a DoS attack on the
endorsers and proposed two anonymization techniques; the
first by using verifiable random functions (VRFs) and the
second by using pseudonyms. In both cases, there is a trade-off
between the network’s efficiency and its security; with both
the sender and the receiver of a proposed transaction in a
private channel to be anonymized [28]. However, this approach
certified with security proofs of Signature Unforgeability and
Unlinkability in Ciphertext (UN-C) that Fabric can be immune
to DoS and wormhole attacks.
V. PRIVACY PRESERVATION
With the current emerge of the blockchain technology, the
transactional data are being made credible (via consensus) and
shareable (via the distributed ledger). However, the adoption
of this advancement endangers the disclosure of the users’
or the companies’ private data. Actually, no user would want
its private information to be revealed to unauthorized entities
exterior to the network and no company would want its
competitors to know any private information regarding the
costs, the prices or the annual salaries of its employees.
Therefore, the collection of the sensitive information and its
secure storage to the distributed ledger is a crucial issue,
since it has to be complied with the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). Therefore, in this section, we present
Fabric’s privacy preservation mechanisms and the few but
critical advancements that are needed to be made in order
to further enhance the clients (users’ or companies’) privacy.
A. Privacy techniques and Fabric’s specification
Fabric supports significant privacy protection mechanisms.
Starting from its permissioned nature that authorizes the
participating entities of the network to strongly authenticate
their identity several features are provided to accommodate
the necessary flavors of privacy.
1) Channels: A channel is a state partition with its own
access policy rules and transactions’ ordering mechanism.
Each channel is managed by a set of peers and it is associated
with some policies that provide access to the corresponding
resources (such as, the ledger’s state, the transactions included
in it and the corresponding chaincodes). When a peer registers
to a channel, which is characterized by a unique identifier;
then the corresponding ledger is created and run on this
peer allowing it to manage an identical and consistent data
store with the rest of the channel’s peers. Therefore, privacy-
preservation mechanisms such as the channels, are highly
important in cases of providing blockchain solutions into a
consortium environment (where the consortium is comprised
by a number of organizations or parties with common business
goals).
2) Private data collection: While the channels are devoted
to the preservation of the information’s privacy, by allowing
the information to be stored separately; the Private Data Col-
lection (PDC) can preserve the privacy of data from another
perspective [3]. The DPC allows, only a stated set of peers
in a channel to preserve the actual data, while the remaining
peers access only its existence proof. The PDC is created to
provide to the peers the capabilities of endorsing, committing,
or queering private data without being forced to create a new
channel and add additional overhead.
The PDC is actually an accumulation of the following
elements: 1) the actual private data; which are sent from/to
authorized peers by means of a gossip protocol, stored on the
peer’s private state databases and can been seen only by this set
of nodes and not by the OSNs (which are not involved in this
case), and 2) the hash of private data that is executed, ordered,
and stored on each peers ledger as evidence of the existence
of the transaction. In some use cases, where a peer of a PDC
wishes to share private data with other peers – for example, to
transfer any asset to a trusted third party (TTP), the TTP can
produce the hash of the private data and subsequently examine
if the output of the hash value is consistent with the hash that
is stored on the channel’s ledger and thus, prove the existence
of the transaction.
The “right-to-be-forgotten” can be used in the private trans-
actions, since each peer can erase its own private database at
any time, with the data itself to be deleted irreversibly and
the hash pointing to the underlying private information to still
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exist. An additional aspect that is implemented with the private
transactions is the limitation of usage. A “BlockToLive” policy
can be defined for each PDC to determine an amount of time
that has to be elapsed with the concealed private database to
be automatically erased.
Despite the privacy that PDCs provide, they should be used
with caution, since the metadata of the private information, is
much more than metadata and can be used to unlock the real
private data. In this attack scenario, the unauthorized peers of
the same channel can observe the shared ledger and detect if
the private transactions occur periodically.
Concluding in this section, the obtained outcomes are that
some peers will have full access to the ledger and others
may only see what they are allowed to. In the case, where
the transactional data must remain hidden during ordering
from some peers of the same channel and the OSNs, the
implementation of PDCs is the solution.
3) Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs): ZKPs establish a sig-
nificant cryptographic primitive to preserve and improve pri-
vacy in the blockchain platforms. In Fabric’s case, there are
two privacy preserving mechanisms that are achieved with the
implementation of ZKPs, and are:
• Identity mixer [33] that leverages ZKPs to provide to the
clients anonymous authentication regarding their trans-
actions’ proposals. The implementation of ZKPs might
have a significant impact when a client’s actual identity
and the attributes that it is associated with, must be kept
secret from the network (such as, the peers). For example,
if the peers wish to verify that a transaction is indeed
sent from a correct client, which is either a member of
a specific organization; (referred in [33] as “membership
proof”), or it indeed possesses a specific set of attributes
(also referred as “selective disclosure of attributes”). In
both cases the identity mixer verifies that the the client’s
identity is not disclosed.
• Zero-Knowledge Asset Transfer (ZKAT) [33] is a method
built on top of anonymous authentication mechanisms
provided by the identity mixer that also uses ZKPs in var-
ious applications aiming at asset management along with
audit support (referred as Zero-Knowledge Asset Transfer
(ZKAT)). With this privacy-preserving mechanism, the
clients can issue transactions without disclosing any other
information to the peers regarding the exchange of assets;
but only the evidence that each transfer is complied with
the asset management rules.
B. Privacy-preservation challenges and open issues
The aforementioned analysis indicates that appropriate safe-
guards are in place to mitigate privacy risks in the context
of Fabric. Although Fabric offers strong privacy-preserving
mechanisms to meet the necessary flavors of privacy, the
research in this field is still ongoing. Thus, some other possible
approaches that could be appropriately adopted in the (near)
future are:
1) Non-interactive ZKPs: Although Fabric prevents unau-
thorized peers to access channel resources, the transactional
data is disclosed to all the channel peers. This limitation
can be overcome with FabZK [34]. FabZK is a proposed
extension for Fabric to support auditable privacy-preserving
chaincode by means of verifiable and well-structured crypto-
graphic primitives, pertaining non-interactive Zero-Knowledge
Proofs (NIZKPs) on Pedersen commitments. The proposed
protocol, manages a set of APIs for the client code and
the chaincode to establish automated validation, while it
improves the transactions’ performance with two validation
steps, in which each party executes active and lightweight
auto-validation. FabZK showed significant results in [34], with
its cryptographic primitives to outperform other approaches
(such as the zkLedger [35]) when the NIZKPs are generated
and verified.
2) Post-quantum signatures: To ensure secure communica-
tion, Fabric relies on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the
digital signatures and the digital identities that are perilous
to the operational security of its network. Moreover, the
GDPR demands “consistent” methods to be employed and
protect each user’s personal identifiable information. However,
Fabric’s ecosystem is not post-quantum secure, making all
the information that is disseminated over the network to be
vulnerable to malicious decryption techniques by a large scale
of quantum computers. Therefore, it is left to see, if post-
quantum digital signatures are going to be implemented in the
(near) future [36].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Appropriate implementations and counter-measures to miti-
gate possible risks in Hyperledger Fabric are discussed in this
paper.
From the consensus protocols security perspective, BFT
consensus protocols, such as BFT-SMaRt are currently being
researched, since they can provide a significant transaction
throughput and tolerance against malicious OSNs. Moreover,
BFT protocols have not yet been deployed in production
environments; it remains to be seen whether and how such
protocols are going to be adopted by the Hyperledger Project.
Regarding the smart contracts, a plethora of techniques have
been discussed to harden the chaincode’s security. However,
a quite-promising trend relies upon formal verification ap-
proaches like theorem proving, formal modeling and sym-
bolic execution to mitigate the chaincode’s risks. With these
approaches, some other aspects of Fabric, such as privacy,
performance, and scalability can be analyzed thoroughly.
From the network’s security perspective, representative at-
tacks were discussed against the network when the MSP is
compromised and proactive solutions having been proposed
as possible mitigation methods. An alternative/complementary
option would be to employ a TEE, such as Intel’s SGX, to
address insider threats and also DDoS attacks resulting from
the manipulation or aversion of the chaincode’s execution.
Techniques to mitigate wormhole attacks vary from those
relying on the anonymization of the senders and recipients
in the transactions inside a channel, to those employing group
signature approaches. Due to the need for accountability in
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Fabric, such solutions need to be further assessed possibly
along with privacy preserving solutions.
Appropriate safeguards to implement the basic privacy
requirements, are discussed to mitigate the privacy risks in the
context of Fabric. The implementation of ZKPs can achieve
anonymous client authentication with identity mixer, privacy-
preserving exchange of assets with ZKAT, and the “right to
be forgotten” can be efficiently implemented with PDCs. As
the research in this area is rapidly evolving, other promising
approaches have been identified that could be adopted in the
(near) future, such as the implementation of NIZKP and post-
quantum digital signatures. These two areas seem to be a
quite promising for research regarding the privacy preservation
mechanisms of Fabric.
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